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Abstract - Recently we have witnessed the worldwide adoption of many different types of 
innovative technologies, such as crowdsourcing, ridesharing, open and big data, aiming at 
delivering public services more efficiently and effectively. Among them, ridesharing has 
received substantial attention from decision-makers around the world. Because of the 
multitude of currently understood or potentially unknown risks associated with ridesharing 
(unemployment, insurance, information privacy, and environmental risk), governments in 
different countries apply different strategies to address such risks. Some governments 
prohibit the adoption of ridesharing altogether, while other governments promote it. In this 
article, we address the question of how risks involved in ridesharing are governed over time. 
We present an in-depth single case study on Singapore and examine how the Singaporean 
government has addressed risks in ridesharing over time. The Singaporean government has 
a strong ambition to become an innovation hub, and many innovative technologies have 
been adopted and promoted to that end. At the same time, decision-makers in Singapore are 
reputed for their proactive style of social governance. The example of Singapore can be 
regarded as a revelatory case study, helping us further to explore governance practices in 
other countries. 
Keywords: risk; ridesharing; transport; governance; innovative technologies; case study; 
Singapore 
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1. Introduction 
In past decades, we have witnessed the worldwide adoption of many different types of 
innovative technologies aiming at delivering more efficient and effective public services [1]. 
The sharing economy is such an example [2]. It is also called the ‘collaborative economy’, 
‘collaborative consumption’, or ‘peer-production economy’, and is defined as any 
marketplace that brings individuals together to share or exchange otherwise underutilised 
assets [3,4]. The sharing economy allows customers to interact with service providers 
through innovative technologies. Many sharing industries, like Uber, BlaBlaCar, AirBnB, 
TaskRabbit, and Grab, have established themselves in many different fields, such as 
transportation, hospitality, and consumer goods. In the United States, millions of citizens rent 
rooms, cars, and even power tools from total strangers. The sharing economy in recent years 
has received substantial attention because its business model has disrupted many traditional 
industries by changing the way in which supply and demand are matched in real-time [5]. 
In the transportation domain, the uncertainty of energy cost, together with the pressure 
to increase energy efficiency and reduce carbon emission, has fuelled interest in seeking 
alternatives to private vehicle use [6,7]. Ridesharing is such an alternative [8], and in North 
America, it can be traced back to “car clubs” or “carsharing clubs” during World War II [9]. 
Traditional carsharing (like carpooling) moves people by using existing infrastructure and 
vehicles more efficiently. However, it is limited in responding to flexible commuting options 
[10]. From the 1990s, some ridematching services have integrated the use of mobile phones, 
social networking, and the internet with the service they offer. A new generation of 
ridematching platforms also known as ‘dynamic ridesharing’ has been developed since 2004 
[11]. This new generation of ridesharing allows individuals to access the benefits of private 
cars without the obligations of car ownership [9]. Some ridesourcing companies, such as 
Uber and Grab, are examples of this new generation of ridesharing and the focus of our work. 
Throughout this manuscript when we refer to ridesharing, we are referring to the 
developments of this new generation of ridesharing companies in Singapore and the service 
they provide. It increases occupancy rates and the efficiency of urban transportation systems 
[12]. It offers commuters a more comfortable and time-efficient travel option and allows 
owners of vehicles to recover some of the journey costs [13]. Furthermore, ridesharing is 
helpful in reducing congestion, pollution, emission, and demand for parking infrastructure 
[14–19]. Ridesharing may also play an important role in redistributing income by providing 
poor residents the opportunity to access cheap transport services or secondary jobs [13]. The 
democratic and policy implications have also been discussed by public policy and governance 
 4 of 37 
 
scholars; they argue that ridesharing enables people to communicate with one another and 
increase social capital, and it is regarded as a new form of civic engagement in policy fields, 
which provides opportunities for citizens to engage directly in developing and implementing 
solutions and services (for example, resolving congestion problem and reducing emission 
through increasing utilisation rates) [20]. In short, ridesharing is viewed by some as highly 
beneficial for both individuals and society as a whole. 
Ridesharing provides productivity gains by increasing the rate of asset utilisation and 
reduction of transaction costs and regulatory overheads [21]. However, ridesharing is 
disrupting existing markets. It is now facing pressure and pushback from the taxi industry 
everywhere. It may also result in concerns about the safety and privacy of customers, unfair 
competition, and service quality [22–24]. 
As some regulation and governance scholars have recognised, innovation and risks are 
inextricably interrelated, since innovation is uncertain both in terms of process and outcome 
[1,6,25]. Little is known about how to govern the risks involved in innovation (specifically 
ridesharing in this article). This begs the following research question: how can the risks 
involved in ridesharing be governed? Different cities/governments have adopted different 
strategies to regulate ridesharing. Some countries, like Germany, have banned the use of 
ridesharing services, such as Uber. Other places, such as New York City, tried to ban it but 
decided to hold back in response to commuters’ demands [26]. In short, it seems that 
governments in different jurisdictions have adopted different strategies in addressing the risks 
in relation to the adoption of ridesharing. We will answer our research question through an 
in-depth case study. Singapore is our chosen case, and we will intensively examine how the 
risks involved in ridesharing are governed by the Singaporean government. 
In Section 2, we present our theoretical framework. Following this, Section 3 lays out 
the method used and the case description. In Section 4, we identify the strategies applied by 
Singapore’s government to address the risks associated with ridesharing. The final section 
consists of a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
This section is structured in three parts. The characteristics of ridesharing are 
summarised in Section 2.1. The risks associated with ridesharing are elaborated in Section 
2.2. Five governance strategies in addressing these risks are elaborated in Section 2.3. 
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2.1. Ridesharing 
Three different types of ridesharing have been identified based on the relationships 
between participants: acquaintance-based, organisation-based, and ad-hoc ridesharing [21]. 
Acquaintance-based ridesharing is generally among families, friends, and co-workers. 
Organisation-based ridesharing demands participants to receive the services by formal 
membership [22]. Ad-hoc ridesharing is achieved through various computerised 
ridematching platforms. In this study, we focus on ad-hoc ridesharing, also called “real-time 
ridesharing” or “instant ridesharing” [11]. The concept of ridesharing as discussed in the 
remainder of this article refers to ad-hoc ridesharing. 
Agatz et al. identified a number of key features of ridesharing: dynamic, independent, 
cost-sharing, non-recurrent trips, and automated matching [11]. The details of these features 
are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. The five features of ridesharing (based on [11]). 
Features Details 
Dynamic Ridesharing allows drivers with spare seats to establish links with users who 
want to have an on-demand ridesharing. 
Independent Drivers are not employees of ridesharing companies. 
Cost-sharing The costs during the trips are shared by participants. This is cost-effectiveness 
for users. However, some ridesharing drivers are profit-seeking. 
Non-recurring trips Trips of ridesharing are non-recurring, implying that ridesharing consists of one-
way trips. 
Automated matching A system helps riders and drivers match each other instantly. 
 
2.2. Risk in the Adoption of Innovative Technologies 
Adoption of many technological innovations, such as big data, waste incineration power 
plants, crowdsourcing, autonomous vehicles (AVs), the internet of things, and block-chain 
technology can cause new problems, since they often have unintended consequences and 
create new, previously inconceivable risks [27,28]. As a result of this, social acceptance of 
such innovative projects may be low [1,29]. 
Risk and uncertainty are two highly related concepts. The former implies that 
probabilities of events and their possible outcomes are known, whereas the latter means that 
we know some events might occur, but we do not know their probabilities [30–32]. Different 
types of risk are present in the adoption of innovative technologies, for example, market risk, 
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political risk, technological risk, finance risk, environmental risk, organisational risk, social 
risk, and turbulence risk [33–38]. In this article, we focus our attention on technological risk, 
which is defined as the potentially negative social, economic, and physical consequences 
related to citizens’ concerns in adopting innovative technologies [39]. Our interest is in 
identifying citizens’ concerns since citizens are direct users of innovative technologies and 
are likely to be negatively influenced by them. 
 
2.3. The Governance of Risks in Ridesharing 
Some researchers have acknowledged that the adoption of innovative technologies will 
inevitably result in some unanticipated risks [40,41]. Often these unknown risks tend to cause 
substantial losses for the involved actors [42]. As such, the governance of these unknown 
risks—which are inherently involved in the adoption of innovative technologies—is of 
crucial importance. 
The issue of the governance of technological risks has received scholarly attention from 
different perspectives, such as the field of governance and public policy [1,6,43–47], 
planning [48], risk management and governance [49–51], science and technological policy 
[52,53], complexity science [54–56], and organisational sociology [42,57]. They provide 
different answers to the question of how technological risks associated with the adoption of 
innovative technologies are governed, and identify some governance strategies, such as 
resistance, prevention, resilience, robustness, antifragility, adaptation, risk assessment, 
deliberation and negotiation, public participation, and learning by doing [53,54,56]. After a 
literature review, we identify five governance strategies that can be adopted by decision-
makers in governing risks involved in the adoption of innovative technologies: no response, 
prevention-oriented strategy, control-oriented strategy, toleration-oriented strategy and 
adaptation-oriented strategy [1,32,45,49,50,52,55–57]. These strategies are elaborated below 
(for a review of the various strategies to govern risks of innovative technologies see [58]): 
 
1. No response: no specific actions are taken by decision-makers to address risks. This 
might happen because decision-makers are not familiar with the potential consequences 
of innovative technologies [31]. If the nature of the innovative technology is unknown, 
decision-makers tend to put off decisions [55]. When ridesharing services were launched 
in the summer of 2012, some local governments did not know whether these new 
services should be established as peer-to-peer taxi services, ridesharing, or for-hire 
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vehicle services [18]. No response also means that decision-makers do not develop 
regulatory frameworks to cope with potential dangers and threats. 
2. Prevention-oriented strategy: decision-makers take preventive actions with the aim of 
eliminating risk in adopting innovative technologies [53,59]. We, for instance, can build 
a wall to prevent the invasion by enemies. In terms of the governance of risks in adopting 
innovative technologies, this strategy implies that decision-makers may prohibit the 
adoption of innovative technologies to avoid the existence of risk. The prevention-
oriented strategy is an appropriate option for situations which are highly predictable, but 
it is slow in its responsiveness, and it might result in system paralysis [60]. 
3. Control-oriented strategy: this strategy favours traditional risk assessment. It assumes 
that scientific knowledge is helpful in narrowing the supposed uncertainties [61], and a 
centralised form of governance style is necessary [45]. In this strategy efforts to eliminate 
risk are considered sub-optimal and achieving an acceptable level of risk through rational 
risk assessment is favoured [62,63]. This partially corresponds with our understanding 
of the regulatory state, which emphasises that decision-makers can regulate risk through 
formal rules or policies [64]. An example of this strategy is that policy makers apply 
existing policies to regulate innovative technologies with the aim of controlling the 
involved risk [65]. 
4. Toleration-oriented strategy: the main aim of this strategy is risk tolerance [66]. It means 
that some actions are taken by decision-makers to prepare the systems or organisations 
to perform well in a constantly changing environment. This strategy partially 
corresponds to the understanding of resilience formed by many scholars, which means 
that a system or organisation can survive a wide range of uncertainties [67,68]. 
Developing alternatives is the first option under this strategy. One instance is when 
governments prepare several different sources of energy for potentially expected events 
[53]. A second option under this strategy can be a policy change or reform [55]. 
5. Adaptation-oriented strategy: decision-makers attempt to improve the adaptive 
capacities of the regulated system or organisation. It corresponds with the idea of 
adaptive resilience identified by some researchers [43,44]. Many different tactics match 
this strategy, such as learning by doing, public participation, forward-looking planning, 
co-deciding, and negotiation [45,48,56,57,67–69]. One example is the establishment of 
an independent review committee facilitating information access to the public [70]. 
Another example is roundtable discussions involving representatives of all potential 
stakeholders that are organised by policy makers in the governance of risk in mobile 
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telephony. No clear rules and specific procedures are established, and a vague list of 
issues to be discussed is developed. The chair of these discussions allows all participants 
to voice their opinions and concerns [49]. 
 
These different government strategies function in this article as a heuristic tool to 
facilitate our analysis of the governance of risk associated with the adoption of ridesharing 
in Singapore. 
 
3. Method and Case Description 
The aim of this article is to answer the question of how technological risk associated 
with the adoption of ridesharing is governed. The case study approach is an appropriate 
strategy for answering how-oriented research questions [71]. Three reasons justify our choice 
of Singapore. First, Singapore is one of the world’s leading innovation hubs [72]. Many 
different types of innovative technologies are adopted there, and the Singapore government 
has accumulated substantial experience in governing risks associated with innovative 
technologies. Second, the Singapore government has a reputation for proactive governance. 
Findings in this article can provide practical suggestions and implications for decision-
makers in other countries. Third, our location made it most practical for us to conduct 
interviews with stakeholders involved in the governance of risks in the adoption of 
ridesharing in Singapore. We view the Singapore case as revelatory because few studies have 
been conducted to research comprehensively how risks associated with ridesharing are 
governed. Through interviews with government officials, researchers of transportation policy 
and the sharing economy, a social media writer and taxi driver, and a newspaper 
correspondent. Data collection and interviews were carried out by the first author during 
2017. Respondent Number 1 was a Newspaper correspondent, Respondents 2 and 3 were 
sharing economy researchers, respondents 4 and 5 were Government officials, respondent 6 
was a Transportation policy researcher, and respondent 7 was a social media writer and taxi 
driver. We traced the process regarding the governance of risks in the adoption of ridesharing, 
and identified the risks involved and strategies applied by the Singapore government in 
coping with risks in adopting ridesharing. Each interview lasted about one hour on average. 
The main comments made by respondents were recorded using notes. In addition, a large 
amount of secondary data was collected. We focused on the two most well-known 
mainstream media, Strait Times and Channel News Asia. We also collected information from 
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the website of the Land Transport Authority (LTA) of Singapore and the discussions in the 
Parliament of Singapore. Based on this extensive body of secondary data along with the 
interviews conducted, the processes regarding the governance of risks associated with 
ridesharing can be summarised. 
We have examined the governance of ridesharing from its initial introduction in 
Singapore in January 2013 to January 2018. Uber and Grab are the two dominant ridesharing 
companies in Singapore. They offer a range of services that can be booked by smartphone. 
The platforms set fares based on distance, location, and demand and the ridesharing 
companies take a 20 percent commission of the charged fares. In 2010, Uber (initially called 
UberCab) was launched in San Francisco and later in 2012 UberX a peer-to-peer ridesharing 
service was introduced. Uber did not own fleets of passenger cars, and they instead recruited 
individual car-owners and drivers. In September 2014, ridesharing services were provided 
by Uber in over 200 cities in 45 countries. Uber states that its vision is having fewer vehicles 
on the roads and allowing access to drivers within minutes and Users of Uber can “e-hail” 
different options ranging from taxi service to limousines, and rides with seats for people with 
special needs and children as well as amateur drivers and carpooling (through UberPool) 
[73]. 
Tan Hooi Ling and Anthony Tan founded Grab, which is mostly used by citizens in 
South-east Asia. Similar to Uber, Grab also expanded from car-hailing to GrabCar 
(ridesharing), GrabBike (motorcycle hailing), GrabExpress (delivery service), and GrabHitch 
(carpooling service). Grab has raised $700 million since 2012 and is considered one of the 
most successful start-ups in Southeast Asia (see https://www.grab.com/sg/about). The 
governance processes of ridesharing in Singapore can be categorised into five different 
phases thus far, and they are presented below. 
 
Phase 1: Hands-Off of Ridesharing (January 2013–September 2014) 
Uber started its trials in Singapore in January 2013 and officially launched its carsharing 
service in February 2013. GrabTaxi started in Malaysia in 2011 and launched in Singapore 
in October 2013. In March and September 2014, Uber launched UberX and Uber Taxi, 
respectively, in Singapore [74]. Initially, Uber and Grab were operating in Singapore 
unfettered. The ridesharing companies saw themselves as technology firms rather than 
transport providers [75]. These companies were viewed as a viable means of addressing 
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problems with access to taxies during peak hours, and they were described as technology 
companies that provided riders and drivers matching services in Singapore. 
 
Phase 2: Regulating Ridesharing (November 2014–July 2015) 
With the popularity of ridesharing, taxi drivers in Singapore started to view ridesharing 
companies as competitors [76]. They argued that the private-car drivers should be subject to 
various regulations that applied to taxis, and at the same time changed their business practices 
to allow taxi bookings using ridesharing platforms. Taxi drivers voiced their disapproval of 
the wide application of ridesharing in Singapore. However, Singapore government has 
established the “Smart Nation” programme as a national vision and is promoting adoption of 
new technologies, implying that it would be counter to the Smart Nation vision to ban the 
use of the ridesharing apps such as Uber in Singapore. Recognising the legitimate concerns 
of the taxi drivers, Singapore government sought to increase the fairness for all players in the 
marketplace. 
In November 2014, LTA started to regulate third-party ridesharing companies and issued 
five regulations to be put into effect from summer 2015. The details of these regulations are 
shown in Table 2 [77]. Moreover, the LTA stated that it would consult the relevant actors 
such as the National Taxi Association (NTA), taxi companies, third-party taxi booking 
services, and commuters about regulation of third-party booking services. 
Table 2. Regulations released in 2014 about third-party ridesharing companies. 
Details 
1. Registering with the LTA: the third-party ridesharing companies are required to register 
with the LTA and if successful in their application will be authorised to carry out their 
service for a period of three years; 
2. Only dispatching licensed drivers with taxi vocational licences to ensure riders are served 
by drivers that are operating legally in Singapore; 
3. Making all fees (flag down and booking fees) and surcharges (location, peak period) and 
rates (per time and distance) available to commuters before the service commences; 
4. Not requiring consumers to specify their destinations before making a booking; 
5. Providing basic customer support (such as providing avenues for feedback or complaints 
and lost-and-found services). 
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On 11 May 2015, Parliament approved the bill, the Third-Party Taxi Booking Service 
Providers Act. This act demanded all third-party taxi booking companies that had more than 
20 participating taxis should register their service with LTA and receive their certificate from 
LTA before they can start their operation [78]. In addition, service providers were required 
to provide the live data on their booking to LTA [79]. LTA allowed existing service providers 
that did not need a certificate to operate before the commencement of the law to continue 
their operation if they registered with the LTA before 1 December 2015 and until their 
application was processed [80]. The application of PAIR Taxi was rejected because it did not 
adhere to the new fare charging framework. Under the new regulations operating without a 
certificate of registration with LTA could cause a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment up 
to six months or both [80]. One 8 July 2015, Uber increased its fare during evening’s SMRT 
train disruption. This led many users of the booking app felt unhappy [81]. One week later, 
on 17 July, LTA stated that surge pricing was used only for chauffeured vehicle booking 
services and not its taxi booking service [82]. 
 
Phase 3: Collecting Opinions of the Stakeholders Involved in Ridesharing and the 
Implementation of the New Regulation (October 2015–December 2015) 
In October 2015, Senior Minister of State for Transport led an industry review. Various 
parties, including commuters, taxi drivers, taxi companies, ridesharing companies, and 
private hire car drivers were consulted. The NTA called for ‘fair competition’ and stated that 
commuter safety should be protected through requiring private-hiring car drivers to pass the 
same checks as regular taxi drivers. On 13 October 2015, the General Insurance Association 
of Singapore advised private owners who are providing ridesharing service using their 
vehicles commercially to acquire appropriate insurance coverage as normal insurance 
coverage does not cover such activities [83]. On 11 November 2015, Grab announced plans 
to launch GrabHitch, a carpooling service that provides a low-cost, door-to-door transport 
service, with prices closer to public transport [84]. 
Five days later, on 16 November 2015, the NTA, along with ten taxi drivers, met with 
Mr. Ng to share concerns and recommendations [85]. On 28 January 2016, GrabTaxi 
announced that it would combine its GrabCar and GrabTaxi services (and others) under a 
new parent company Grab [86]. 
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Phase 4: The Reforms of the Current Regulation Framework (April 2016–June 2016) 
On 12 April 2016, a new licensing framework, Private Hire Car Driver Vocational 
Licensing (PDVL) framework, was released that would come into effect in the first half of 
2017 (see Table 3) [87]. This regulation required all drivers of the private hire car to have a 
background check and participate in a 10 h training course and pass the necessary tests. In 
addition, the existing Taxi Driver Vocational Licence (TDVL) was updated. The duration of 
the courses that the taxi drivers needed to attend was shortened from six- to nine-hour to 
between three- to five-hour and in addition the course now included training for using tools 
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) [87]. On 28 April 2016, Strides Transportation, 
launched a variety of ridesharing services and signed a one-year contract with Grab to allow 
its over 200 drivers to use the ridematching service offered by Grab [88]. On 13 June 2016, 
Grab stated its first cross-border carpooling which allows the commuters to share their 
ridesharing between Johor Bahru and Singapore [89]. One week later, on 20 June 2016, LTA 
indicated that it deemed the service model not compatible with regulations in Singapore and 
had informed the company about it [90]. As a result, the ridesharing service offered by Grab 
between Singapore and Johor Bahru, that had started on 20 June was changed to a free three-
week trial [91]. 
 
Phase 5: Further Levelling the Playing Field and Consolidation (August 2016–January 
2018) 
On 21 August 2016, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that the competition 
between taxis and ride-hailing services was still not quite level and that this issue would be 
further examined [92]. In September 2016, a new partnership between Trans-cab and Grab 
was announced to bring all of the Trans-cab fleet to the Grab platform [93]. Also, in the same 
month, Singapore government stated that it would review its Taxi Availability (TA) 
framework. The TA standards were established in January 2013. They required taxis drivers 
to work a certain minimum daily mileage and during the peak hours. In contrast, private-
hiring cars did not have to adhere to these requirements. LTA claimed that it would monitor 
the situation carefully and guarantee the needs of the users and the welfare of taxi drivers 
[94]. 
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Table 3. The Private Hire Car Driver Vocational Licensing (PDVL) framework and Taxi Driver 
Vocational Licensing [95]. 
Screening All applicants should undergo a medical examination and background checks. 
Eligibility Only Individuals that are employed by a limousine company or are registered as 
owners of such a company can provide chauffeured services. 
Training All applicants must successfully pass a PDVL course and participate in refresher 
course every six years. PDVL holders with no demerit points, and who have been 
active drivers, will be exempt from the refresher course. 
Disciplinary measures PDVL licensees would be subject to the Vocational Licence Points System (VLPS). 
 
On 23 September 2016, nuTonomy started testing two driverless cars it developed in a 
partnership with Grab to allow its users to try them out for free [96]. On 25 September 2016, 
in an accident involving a private hire car under Uber, a woman was killed [97]. On 17 
December 2016, LTA released its review report about TA, and it stated that the “percentage 
of taxis with minimum daily mileage of 250 km” requirements would be removed [98]. In 
January 2017, a new law proposed to give a new set of powers to authorities to crack down 
on ridesharing provides in case their drivers operate without proper insurance or licences 
[99]. Moreover, in January 2017, LTA announced that ride-hailing services such as Uber and 
Grab required car seats for young children as under Road Traffic Act, carrying passengers 
under 1.35 m was illegal without a booster seats or child restraints, and these services, unlike 
taxi services that were public service vehicles, were not exempt from this ruling. 
On 7 February, the Minister for Transport stated that it would create new rules to share 
data from the trials, set standards for the design of the AV equipment, and place time and 
space limits on AV trials [100], and The Road Traffic Act was amended [101]. The Road 
Traffic Act now recognised that in AV testing the vehicle is no longer in control of the human 
driver and exempted the AV system and its operator and people involved in the trials of AVs 
from provisions that held human driver responsible for the use of vehicle and recognised that 
the vehicle is now controlled by the AV system. To avoid stifling innovation a five-year 
regulatory sandbox was developed before enactment of legislations. In the meantime, AVs 
need to pass safety assessments and must have accident mitigation plans before testing can 
commence [100]. 
Furthermore, news came out that PDVL would be implemented from the second half of 
2017 [102]. The drivers had to apply for the PDVL by 30 of June, after which they would be 
given up to a year to successfully complete the 10-h PDVL course, undergo medical and 
background checks and have proper insurance and be in possession of Class 3 driving licence 
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for at least two years [99,103]. Operating a private hire car without a decal or vocational 
licence can result in a fine of up to $1000, jail up to three months, or both, in the first instance 
[104]. Later in March 2017, LTA opened the applications for PDVL and almost immediately 
afterwards, both Uber and Grab stated that they would pay the costs of the drivers to obtain 
their licences [103]. In June, over 90 percent of drivers of Uber had registered for the 
FastLane programme that was rolled out in March to facilitate the process of the drivers 
attaining the PDVL as it became a requirement for all private hire drivers [105]. 
Furthermore, in March 2017 new amendments were introduced in parliament to existing 
legislation in Singapore addressing cybercrime. The Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity 
Amendment were passed in May 2017 criminalising dealing and trading personal information 
such as credit card records even if the trader may not have intruded into a computer system 
for gaining access to the information, the amendment also includes crimes committed outside 
Singapore and on computers overseas if such an act causes significant risk of harm in 
Singapore [106]. In June 2017, Grab announced extending its group personal accident 
insurance to cover its carpool services aiming to complement the personal motor insurance 
purchased by their drivers and guarantee safe travel to its riders [107]. Moreover, a new 
Cybersecurity Act was scheduled to be introduced in the middle of 2017 to address any 
existing legislative gaps after public consolations. The bill was released in July 2017 giving 
Cyber Security Agency (CSA) power to investigate cyber security incidents while working 
with regulation in that sector. Consultations were held in July and August 2017, and it was 
reported that 92 entities provided feedback which was mostly positive and resulted in minor 
edits to the proposed bill which is scheduled for introduction in 2018 [108]. 
In early August 2017, the Wall Street Journal learned that Uber had knowingly bought 
more than 1000 defective Honda Vezels and through their Lion City Rentals, rented them to 
drivers while knowing they had been recalled and one had caught fire in January 2017 [109]. 
By 17 August just two weeks after the news broke out, according to LTA, Uber had recalled 
the entire 1220 defective Hondas and fixed them, and LTA stated it had been monitoring the 
recall process [110]. In August 2017, the largest taxi company in Singapore, ComfortDelGro, 
signed a letter with Uber for exclusive discussions on a potential alliance with Uber, which 
could made ComfortDelGro’s 15,500 taxis available through Uber’s app and given its in-
house engineering and maintenance capabilities help forming a partnership in managing the 
15,000 vehicles owned by Lion City Rental that is an Uber-owned company as well 
[111,112]. The deal would be beneficial for Uber as well since it would get access to a large 
fleet of vehicles without the need for subsidise or funds [109]. It is worth mentioning that 
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since March 2017 the other five taxi companies in Singapore (SMRT, Trans-Cab, Premier, 
Prime, and HDT Singapore Taxi) already had made similar arrangements with Grab and 
offered dynamic fare pricing and in October 2017 Grab announced an exclusive partnership 
with SMRT that provided Grab drivers exclusive access to SMRT’s maintenance and 
engineering services [113]. 
In November 2017, news broke out that Uber had a major security breach in 2016 which 
compromised personal details of 57 million accounts worldwide and had paid ransom to 
hackers [114]. Following the news of the incident, various experts highlighted that laws must 
be tightened and commercial entities should inform consumers and authorities when such 
breaches occur. As mentioned earlier, major changes to Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) 
were proposed in Singapore in July 2017 which included requiring the organisations that 
suffer from a breach to notify consumers as soon as they become aware of it and in case the 
data of more than 500 are involved Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) must also 
be notified within 72 h and in case critical infrastructure is involved Singapore’s Cyber 
Security Agency (CSA) must be informed based on a new proposed cyber security bill which 
is expected to be debated in 2018. 
Later, in December 2017, news broke out that the personal information of 380,000 of 
accounts in Singapore were compromised as part of the breach in 2016, and subsequently the 
PDPC stated that it had started investigation whether Uber was in breach of any laws in 
Singapore and LTA made similar statement, expecting full transparency and cooperation 
with regulators investigating the breach [115]. In the same month, ComfortDelGro 
announced its intentions to acquire 51 percent stake of the Lion City Holdings valued at $642 
million, subject to regulatory approval and Uber and ComfortDelGro’s applications will be 
integrated under “uberFLASH” and offer dynamic fare pricing if booked through Uber app 
similar to the Grab offering since March 2017 [113]. Given the implementation of PDVL 
earlier in July 2017, this deal would also enable Uber to increase its supply of drivers which 
through the implementation of PDVL might become harder to increase or maintain in future 
[116]. Following the announcement of the proposed Uber-ComfortDelGro collaboration The 
Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS), stated that due to competitive nature of the 
rental car market it would seek public consultation and feedback on the alliance starting from 
21 of December 2017 to 8 of January 2018 [117]. While still under review, with special 
permission uberFlash service started operation in January 2018 [118]. After this first round 
of consultation, CCS continued a caution approach and carried out a second round of 
consultation in January 2018 and stated if there are concerns it will continue and carry out 
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more exhaustive deliberations given that with the alliance between Uber and ComfortDelGro 
would create a 27,000-vehicle fleet which will be the largest in Singapore. 
 
4. Case Analysis 
In this section, we summarise the types of risk involved in the adoption of ridesharing, 
then analyse how the risks involved in ridesharing are governed in Singapore. 
 
4.1. Risk in Ridesharing 
Ridesharing may result in technological risk. Based on our interviews and secondary 
data, we identify five key risks. They are elaborated in detail below. 
 
1. Privacy: ridesharing platforms collect sensitive information about their customers, such 
as telephone numbers, geolocation data [119], and credit card numbers. Some users of 
ridesharing have complained about the ridesharing company’s inappropriate gathering 
or use of data. Some critics even label Uber as a big data company that is transforming 
its business and focusing on leveraging the wealth of information it gathers to provide 
new services and generate revenue by selling this data to others [120]. If the collected 
private data on journalists, elected officials, and venture capitalists were used 
improperly, the outcomes might be disastrous [23]. Although Uber has been working on 
improving its privacy policy, it is not yet certain whether its policy will be effective in 
the future, and the Uber data Breach in November 2017 confirmed the difficulty of this 
task. Respondents 4 and 5 told us that privacy is not a serious concern for citizens in 
Singapore because the PDPA was already passed in 2012 to protect the privacy of 
citizens. Moreover, major changes and additional requirements were introduced to 
PDPA in summer 2017, and additional cybersecurity measures are to be introduced in 
2018 through Cybersecurity Act. Private companies will be fined if they use citizens’ 
private information in any illegal form. Currently, in response to the breach of personal 
information of Singaporeans, empowered by the existing legislation, the PDPC is 
investigating Uber. 
2. Safety: customer safety raises concerns for users of ridesharing services in many 
countries [11]. Customers may feel unsafe when in cars driven by strangers [22]. 
Ridesharing drivers are not professionally trained and licensed like their tax driver 
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counterparts. The background checks for drivers of ridesharing are not as strict as they 
are for taxi drivers. Drivers of ridesharing do not need to conduct fingerprint scans, as 
taxi drivers do. Cases of molestation, misappropriation, use of criminal force, and driving 
under the influence thus far have been addressed in courts [121–123]. In addition, the 
vehicles used for ridesharing may not be as rigorously inspected. For example, Uber does 
not require regular vehicle inspections, and same levels of safety inspections that 
conventional taxies go through are not applied to its cars [124]. Respondent 6 has argued 
that the main motivation of private hire car drivers is to earn more money. Many drivers 
in Singapore buy second-hand cars to work for Uber and Grab, due to the high cost of 
buying new cars (Respondent 7). This raises some concerns, as these drivers mostly want 
to earn more money and might not prioritise safety (Respondents 6 and 7) and indeed 
the acknowledgment by Uber that it could have done more in the case of defective Honda 
Vezels suggests that this problem is not limited to drivers [110]. 
3. Influence on incumbent industries: ridesharing is disruptive, implying that it may result 
in unanticipated consequences for incumbent industries. In this case, the taxi drivers 
viewed ridesharing companies as their competitors, and taxi drivers claimed that the use 
of ridesharing platforms such as Uber and Grab has negatively influenced their 
businesses (Respondents 6 and 7). The taxi industry argues that ridesharing does not 
have to comply with pricing or consumer protections and therefore has an unfair 
advantage [70]. Uber, for instance, employs a ‘surge price’ when demand is high. On 8 
July 2015, Uber increased its fare during that evening’s SMRT train disruption. This led 
to great dissatisfaction among many users [81]. On 25 November 2015, UberX in 
Singapore fares were reportedly as much as 3.8 times higher during North-South Line 
train disruptions [125]. According to the LTA data, the average of unhired taxis went up 
to 5.9 percent in the first 11 months of 2016 from 4.2 in 2015 [126]. This shows that the 
adoption of ridesharing disrupted the taxi industry and had a negative influence on the 
lives of taxi drivers. 
4. Liability: ridesharing as an innovation may result in the rise of non-professional and non-
regulated workers. Many ridesharing drivers use rental cars (Respondents 6 and 7) and 
may therefore not be insured. When accidents occur, this may result in losses for drivers 
and passengers. Insurance-wise, an unresolved legal question is who is liable when in an 
accident when a ridesharing vehicle is involved (Respondents 4–6). Uber has denied 
liability for accidents that occur during the use of its service [97]. Uber’s argument is 
that it only provides a platform that facilitates matching drivers with passengers thus 
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bearing no legal responsibilities for property damage or injuries caused by the drivers. 
Some, however, argue that ridesharing companies enjoy profits but offload risks onto 
others [70]. In September 2016, an accident involving a ridesharing vehicle occurred in 
Singapore, and a 19-year old girl died [97]. Additional deaths have resulted from the 
negligence of Uber and Grab drivers following this initial accident [123,127,128]. 
Currently, there is no consensus regarding the question of how to deal with ridesharing 
cars when they are involved in accidents and courts are addressing the issues on a case-
by-case basis (Respondents 4 and 5). The introduction of mandatory insurance through 
PDVL for private hire drivers and mandatory car seat for children demonstrates the 
efforts to resolve the liability concerns. 
5. Automation: With the development of ridesharing in Singapore, automation has seen 
considerable progress (Respondents 1, 4, and 5). As it was mentioned earlier, in 
September 2016, nuTonomy tested two driverless cars it had developed and set up a 
partnership with Grab to allow its users to try them out for free. In December 2016, Grab 
announced an investment from Japanese automaker Honda as part of a deal to collaborate 
on a motorbike-hailing service. Grab and Honda would form a partnership to develop 
ridesharing technology [129]. It is certain that autonomous ridesharing will come about 
in the near future, meaning that users will be able to book an AV for their journeys. 
Automation of ridesharing potentially can drastically change transportation systems as 
it can reduce fatalities due to crashes, and can increase the mobility of the elderly and 
disabled as well as increase road capacity, lower emissions, and increase fuel savings 
[130]. It may, however, result in new challenges for decision-makers. For example, it 
may lead to unemployment among taxi and private hire car drivers due to decreased 
demands on cars with drivers. Moreover, new unintended consequences are surfacing, 
such as the exacerbation of an organ shortage due to the decreasing number of deaths 
because of driver errors in motor-vehicles accidents by 94% [131]. The General 
Insurance Association is engaging the LTA on the implications of AVs for insurance, 
and still gathering facts on these new developments [132]. In our interviews, 
Respondents 1, 4, and 5 argued that the automation of ridesharing is not a major concern. 
Automation is still at the pilot stage and has a long way to go before it is widely adopted 
(Respondent 1). Currently, the LTA has established a partnership with A*STAR to 
provide a technical platform to test the use of AVs. Specifically, demarcated routes in a 
business park (one-north) located in Queenstown have been identified to support the 
testing of this technique [133]. For instance, certain time and space limitations have been 
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set on trials involving driverless vehicles. Moreover, design standards will be established 
for the equipment used in such vehicles, and the developers involved in these tests will 
be required to share data (Respondents 4 and 5). 
 
These five concerns are the main technological risks associated with ridesharing. They 
are highly related to the concerns of users and require serious consideration by decision-
makers. After identifying these concerns, the strategies applied by the Singapore government 
to cope with them are elaborated in the following section. 
 
4.2. The Governance of Risks in Ridesharing in Singapore 
In this case, five different types of governance strategies in coping with risks associated 
with ridesharing can be identified. They are: the no response strategy, the prevention-oriented 
strategy, the control-oriented strategy, the toleration-oriented strategy, and the adaptation-
oriented strategy. These strategies are elaborated below. 
1. No response: when Uber and Grab started their operations in phase one, Singapore’s 
government regarded them as an innovative technology that can efficiently achieve an 
automated matching between drivers and users [75]. As such, they essentially promoted 
their wide adoption, and it is argued that ridesharing is helpful in resolving traffic 
congestion problems (Respondents 4 and 5). At the time, no framework was established 
to specifically regulate ridesharing, which indicates a no response strategy. 
2. Prevention-oriented strategy: it was reported that the carpooling service offered by Grab 
would soon enable people to use it to share a ride across the border between Singapore 
and Johor Bahru in Malaysia in Phase Four. However, the LTA in Singapore soon 
informed the company that the service model did not comply with Singapore’s 
regulations. It is likely that Malaysian regulations do not permit Singapore-registered 
cars to provide ridesharing services either without a public service vehicle licence. The 
Singapore government thus decided to prohibit the ridesharing service of Grab between 
Singapore and Johor Bahru with the aim of eliminating the existence of risk (Respondent 
1). This indicates the application of a prevention-oriented strategy. 
3. Control-oriented strategy: to manage the development of ridesharing in Singapore and 
collect information about a number of private hire ridesharing drivers, it is necessary to 
take regulatory actions (Respondent 7). In this case, Parliament approved the Third-party 
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Taxi Booking Service Providers Act. Under this law, all third-party providers of taxi 
booking services are required to register themselves with LTA and comply with its 
regulations (Respondents 4 and 5). The Singapore government also developed a PDVL 
framework for private hire car drivers, which comes into effect in the first half of 2017 
(Respondents 4 and 5). In addition, since Singapore’s government passed the PDPA in 
2012, and its amendment in 2017, the use of personal data is already strictly regulated 
(Respondents 4 and 5). Another example is the regulation of driverless ridesharing in 
Singapore. Respondent 1 argued that driverless ridesharing is a highly complex issue, as 
it might result in many unanticipated consequences for society. In February 2017, it was 
reported that the LTA would set time and space limits for driverless vehicles and 
establish design standards for equipment in such vehicles [100]. This all indicates an 
attempt to regulate the functions of ridesharing in Singapore, which points to the 
adoption of a control-oriented strategy by the government. 
4. Toleration-oriented strategy: the taxi industry in Singapore has been over-regulated in 
past years (Respondents 2 and 3). Singapore increasingly recognised that the playing 
field needs to be levelled further, and the government has attempted to deregulate the 
taxi industry and promote their competitiveness vis-a-vis the ridesharing services 
(Respondents 4 and 5). It updated the regulatory framework for taxi drivers, TA, and 
removed certain regulations, such as the minimum daily 250 km mileage requirement to 
be upheld by a percentage of taxies, and the percentage of taxis operating during the peak 
hours (shoulder peak periods requirement), with the aim of further levelling the playing 
field (Respondent 6). The creation of a regulatory sandbox for testing AVs and 
amendment of Road Traffic Act to allow exemptions for AV testing further indicates 
that the reforms of current policies indicate the emergence of a toleration-oriented 
strategy. 
5. Adaptation-oriented strategy: Singapore’s government established a committee to 
review the risks regarding ridesharing in Phase Three. Respondents 4 and 5 told us that 
the LTA organised several rounds of interactions among different actors, including 
government officials, managers of taxi companies, representatives of taxi drivers, and 
managers of private hire car companies. These different actors exchanged ideas about 
the governance of ridesharing in Singapore. In addition, some taxi drivers sent emails or 
letters to officials of the LTA and the Ministry of Transport (MOT). Their complaints 
about the adoption of the ridesharing were well received, and explanations about the 
rationale behind the adoption of specific regulations for ridesharing were provided to 
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them (Respondents 4 and 5). This shows that the Singapore government has attempted 
to enhance mutual understanding between various actors with the aim of building 
consensus regarding the nature of the risks involved in ridesharing. This consensus-
based approach indicates the emergence of an adaptation-oriented strategy. 
 
Note that the governance practice might be complicated, particularly in the context of 
addressing the risks of innovative technologies. A single government might adopt several 
different strategies simultaneously. In this case, the Singapore government combined the use 
of the adaptation-oriented strategy with control- and toleration-oriented strategies. It 
collected opinions from different stakeholders involved in the governance of ridesharing 
(adaptation) and released the Third-party Taxi Booking Service Providers Act and the PDVL 
framework (control), before finally reforming the TA framework (toleration) to improve the 
competitiveness of taxicabs. In addition, the government rejected the application of PAIR 
Taxi because its fare model did not meet the fare charging regulations of LTA. The rejection 
of PAIR Taxi’s application could be due to the combination of a prevention-oriented 
(avoiding risk) and a control-oriented (regulating potential dangers and threats) strategy. The 
combined use of different strategies by a decision-maker might occur, but this does not 
downplay the usefulness of our typology of government strategies because its main aim is to 
provide an analytical tool for researchers to categorise government actions in the governance 
of risks associated with innovative technologies. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our case study suggests that an adaptation-oriented approach is a comparatively better 
approach for decision-makers in addressing technological risks associated with the adoption 
of innovative technologies (including ridesharing). In this case, the Singapore government 
has learned to apply such a strategy in coping with risks in ridesharing. We nevertheless must 
acknowledge the particularities of the Singapore case. First, innovation has been established 
as a national strategy by the government [72]. Singapore has been widely regarded as one of 
the most innovative countries around the world. In the Global Innovation Index (GII), a well-
known index to measure innovativeness of nations, Singapore ranked the sixth most 
innovation nation [134]. Because of this, many technology companies view Singapore as a 
suitable environment to experiment new technologies. Innovation is a key feature of 
Singapore, and the government tends to support the development and application of various 
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innovative technologies in Singapore. As a result, Singapore government prefers reconciling 
innovative technologies with the incumbent industries. Second, the Singapore government is 
highly responsive to the demands of citizens. After the establishment of Singapore, the 
government has promised to provide its citizens a high standard of living. As Respondents 4 
and 5 argued, Singapore is a city-state, and its government has a tradition of applying a 
proactive style in societal governance. In the governance of social housing, the Housing 
Development Board (HDB), for instance, has established rather strict rules in responding to 
citizen feedbacks [135]. Citizens in Singapore have many channels for providing feedback 
such as through hotlines, emails, and letters, and HDB officials regularly collect these 
feedbacks, which are then analysed by Quality Service Managers. These analyses function 
as an important basis for HDB to make decisions. Because of these smart institutional 
designs, Singapore government has always treated citizen viewpoints seriously. It is therefore 
likely that it may apply an adaptation-oriented strategy in coping with the risks involved in 
ridesharing. Furthermore, an important factor contributing to the success of this proactive 
adaptation-oriented approach is the presence of a high level of policy capacity. Policy 
capacity is defined as the ability to arrange and allocate required resources to make intelligent 
decisions and to set appropriate directions that are beneficial to the public [136,137]. 
Presence of high policy capacity in Singapore and proactive engagement of the government 
[138,139] resulted in course adjustments by the ride-hailing companies as demonstrated 
through rapid reaction to PDVL, provision of child-friendly seating options, a two-week 
response and addressing defective vehicles by Uber and cooperation with LTA, PDPC, and 
CCS. Moreover, given the size and population of Singapore, it is relatively easy for 
Singapore’s government to gain accurate information about the wishes of its citizens, which 
allows it to adjust its policies contingently. 
Our case study has two crucial implications for decision-makers in other countries 
regarding the governance of risks in ridesharing. First, an adaptive approach is a favourable 
approach for decision-makers to prepare them for unanticipated consequences. Ridesharing 
is transforming the traditional transportation landscape around the world, and it is neither 
wise to prohibit its adoption nor to let it go unregulated. The former might discourage 
innovation, while the latter has a substantially negative impact on the incumbent industry. 
Our case study about Singapore may provide blueprints for other countries in the governance 
of innovative technologies. Decision-makers should actively collect the opinions and 
perspectives of different stakeholders involved in ridesharing and create a consensus 
regarding what are the best strategies for governing the risks. Second, the governance model 
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developed in Singapore cannot necessarily be directly copied by other countries. As this 
research suggests, decision-makers in different countries should take into account the unique 
characteristics of the system they operate in (such as the state of the transportation subsystem, 
the level of acceptance of ridesharing among citizens, the governance structure—for 
example, the positions of taxi associations—and pressures from the traditional incumbent 
industry) and avoid a one-size-fits-all approach. For instance, a city with a serious traffic 
congestion problem might approach this issue differently from a city without a traffic 
congestion problem. Decision-makers should think carefully about the implications of their 
unique situations and design appropriate strategies for better governing the risks of 
ridesharing. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this article, we have reported an in-depth case study to present which types of 
technological risks concern Singapore’s government and citizens and examined how the 
government has addressed these risks so far. We found that Singapore’s government has 
identified five different types of technological risk: privacy, liability, automation, safety, and 
the impact on incumbent industries. To cope with them, Singapore’s government has adopted 
five different strategies: no response, and prevention-, control-, toleration-, and adaptation-
oriented responses. 
A few studies have been conducted to explore how decision-makers govern innovative 
technologies [1,6]. This study is revelatory and provides insights for decision-makers in other 
countries on how to proactively address the risks of ridesharing. The wide access to 
smartphones and the internet makes it easier for citizens around the world to use ridesharing 
to meet their travel needs. Governments face difficulties in governing the risks associated 
with ridesharing, and with growing rates of adoption and the possibility of widespread 
automation of these services in the future, this issue is becoming a priority. Our case study 
showed a comparatively positive example regarding the governance of risks in the adoption 
of ridesharing. The Singapore government neither prohibits the development of ridesharing 
nor lets its development go completely free. Rather, it takes proactive measures to level the 
playing field to achieve both the wide application of this innovative technology and increase 
the competitiveness of the incumbent taxi industry. In this case, it seems that the Singapore 
government has applied an adaptation-oriented approach to address the technological risks 
associated with ridesharing, collecting the opinions, perspectives, and ideas of different 
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stakeholders involved in its governance. It favours a bottom-up approach in resolving the 
complaints of the taxi drivers and attempting to have face-to-face negotiations with them to 
build consensus. Moreover, with the rapid technological advancement and development of 
new business models, Singapore’s government is proactively monitoring the implementation 
of its policies on regulating ridesharing and making adjustments to address potential 
concerns. 
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Acronyms Full Name 
AV Autonomous Vehicle 
CCS Competition Commission of Singapore 
CSA Cyber Security Agency 
GPS Global Positioning System 
LTA Land Transport Authority 
NTA National Taxi Association 
PDPA Personal Data Protection Act 
PDPC Personal Data Protection Commission 
PDVL Private Hire Car Driver Vocational Licensing 
TA Taxi Availability  
VLPS Vocational Licence Points System 
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